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Abstract: Since the early 2000s, member countries of the Union of South America Nations
(UNASUR) have moved drastically to the left of the political spectrum and have implemented
protectionist economic reforms. Contrary to what many studies and scholars have concluded, the
political realignment of the region and the implementation of protectionist policies has had a
positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the region. For the past two
decades, total FDI inflows into the region has increased drastically from $8 billion to $150
billion. This study found that there is a combination of both economic reform and governance
variables which continues to foster a positive business environment for foreign investors within
UNASUR member countries. The variables that proved to be most significant were: protection of
property rights, credit availability, control of corruption, regulatory control, and government
effectiveness.
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Regime Shifts:
Import Substitution Industrialization (1930-1960) –
For the past 80 years, South American countries have been through drastic economic and
political changes. During the 30 year period from 1930 to 1960, countries among the region had
implemented protectionist policies and adopted the import-substitution industrialization (ISI)
model, which was developed under the dependency framework established by Raul Prebisch. In
the short-run these policies increased domestic production and successfully increased the quality
of life for the working class population. This period became known as the ‘golden age’ for South
American economic development and growth. Domestic markets were flourishing, economic
growth rates averaged at 5% for the region, and the countries were finally adjusting to the
positive trend in other developing regions (Castaneda, 2006). However, in the long run the ISI
model proved to be detrimental since it drastically increased social inequalities, produced high
levels of inflation, and concentrated wealth in the hands of the few (Valdez and Foster, 2007).
The economic and social problems that were hurting the majority working class gave strength to
different political and economic fronts, mainly led by right-wing military leaders, which were
pushing for market oriented reforms. Alongside U.S support for modernization and the adoption
of market oriented reforms, these forces gave rise to a long lasting period of military autocracies
in the region – Ecuador (1963–1966 and 1972–1978); Brazil (1964–1985); Bolivia (1964–1970
and 1971–1982); Argentina (1966–1973 and 1976–1983); Peru, (1968–1980); Chile (1973–
1990); and Uruguay (1973–1984).
Neoliberalism (1960-2000) –
The military regimes immediately liberalized trade, accumulated large amount of debt
from western banks and institutions, and implemented neoliberal economic reforms that hurt the
domestic producer. Even with the reforms and the close trade ties that were being built with the
U.S., these regimes were unsuccessful in creating an attractive business environment for foreign
investors (Montero, 2008). The policies in place at the time saturated domestic markets and led
the region to the debt crisis of the early 1980s due to unsustainable debt levels. Because of the
poor economic performance, repressive regimes, skyrocketing debt levels, increasing social
inequality, and strong push for democratization, most military regimes fell to the hands of the
civilians during the mid-1980s. With the fall of the military regimes, most governments were

now in the hands of the right-wing elites who refused to drift from the neoliberal path. Economic
policies continued to focus on deregulation, unilateral trade liberalization, privatization, and most
importantly macroeconomic stability (Valdez and Foster, 2007). In regards to trade, most
countries focused on the elimination of export taxes, the gradual reduction of the level of import
tariffs, and the partial or total removal of trade restrictions in order to increase FDI and trade
flows. The post-military governments were also unsuccessful in attracting foreign investors and
proved that governments needed to focus on developing local markets, a strong financial
infrastructure, and creating political stability.
During the beginning of the 1990s, South America was being left out of major trade
agreements (Montero, 2008). Regional trade blocs were being established in the developing
world and foreign investors were ignoring South America. The need for economic integration
gave birth to the creation of regional trade blocs during the early 1990s. Two major trade
alliances were established as a result of the neoliberal regime. The Common Market of the
Southern Cone (MERCOSUR – 1991) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN – 1993)
successfully gave member countries bargaining power and access to international markets.
Economic growth rates were rising again as a result of the export-led growth model which
proved to be a successful way of aligning to the international trade system. Successful economic
integration, the adoption of neoliberal economic policies, political stability and the availability of
natural resources significantly increased FDI inflows during the early 1990s (Biglaiser and
DeRouen, 2006).
During the 1990s, South American economies and the majority of the working class
people were dependent on agriculture. The reforms implemented during those years aimed at
increasing trade, especially in the agricultural sector. However, the adoption of neoliberal
ideologies during the 1980s and the ‘Washington Consensus’ had a significant impact on
agricultural prices, which translated into a deterioration in terms of the quality of life, income
levels, and overall economic opportunities for the working class (Castaneda, 2006). At the time,
the economy was booming and FDI inflows were skyrocketing, but all of this growth was
happening at the expense of the lower and middle class. According to the World Bank, the
amount of FDI flowing into South American economies was 16 times greater in 1999 than in
1989 (Figure 1). Most South American countries were part of the GATT (General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade), and by the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994 all South American countries
had joined the newly established World Trade Organization (Valdez and Foster, 2007). The
annexation of the two regional trade blocs, CAN and MERCOSUR, to the WTO lowered trade
barriers even more, and formed new bilateral trade agreements within the WTO’s neoliberal
framework. The problem with these agreements was that it largely benefited MCS’s and foreign
investors since foreign MNC’s, especially in the oil and energy sector, were not forced to
reinvest or keep monetary revenues in the host country, this had a spillover effect into wages and
agricultural prices. The neoliberal regime that governed the continent from the 1960s until the
early 2000s produced high growth rates and substantially increased foreign investment, but it did
little for the majority working class since there was no impact on poverty or social inequalities.

Figure 1 - Total FDI inflows into Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay and Venezuela during the 1990s - Source: WDI.

The ‘New’ Left (2000 – Present) –
During the late 1990s, the capitalist regimes that were controlled by the same elites that
had implemented the reforms of the early 1980s were reluctant to drifts apart from their
economic agenda, even though social and economic tensions were rising. The President of Brazil
from 1995-2003, Fernando Henrique Cardoso – a right-wing conservative – said during his 1998
campaigns that "the process of liberalization of the economy and opening toward the outside
world will continue, not as an objective in and of itself, but as a strategic element in the
modernization of our economy”. Unfortunately for Henrique Cardoso, and most right-wing

neoliberal regimes, they were not able to sustain themselves any longer. The early 2000s saw the
crumbling of the neoliberal regime that had been implemented during the previous decades,
mainly because overwhelming social discontent (Montero, 2008). Argentina, Ecuador, Chile,
Uruguay, Bolivia and even the powerhouse of the region, Brazil, went into deep economic and
political crises. Corruption scandals and banking meltdowns – Argentina, Ecuador, and Brazil –
gave strength to the leftist movements, mainly led by strong populist leaders and former socialist
activist, which were pushing for a more egalitarian society. This strong socialist movement gave
rise to a new ‘leftist’ political front - Da Silva in Brazil, Chavez in Venezuela, Correa in
Ecuador, Kirchner in Argentina, Morales in Bolivia, Vasquez in Uruguay and Bachelet in Chile.
Alongside the rise of leftist regimes there were also major shifts in economic policy
among the region. There was a reversal of the privatization process; with the exception of Chile
many privately owned companies were now controlled by the state. Many foreign companies
were forced to leave or to stay under a different set of terms, this however did not have an impact
on FDI inflows into the region. The nationalization of former private corporations became the
main tool for governments to increase their revenue sources since tax increases was not an
option. Oil fields were nationalized in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil; gas fields in Bolivia,
telecommunication corporations in Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela, and newspapers in Chile,
Peru and Uruguay (Castaneda, 2006). In terms of tax reforms, corporate taxes and import taxes
were raised and special taxes were imposed on the transferring of capital to foreign countries.
However, the overall tax environment did not vary greatly since governments wanted to continue
to attract foreign investors. There were also a series of new regulations and laws that created a
more regulated financial system. The economic success of the regional integration process and
the need for western financial independence gave birth to the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) in 2004, which merged the CAN and MERCOSUR trade blocs. This union further
increased trade among member countries and diversified foreign investment portfolios to include
South American corporation. Previously, only U.S and European corporations were present in
South American ground, but with the annexation of the two major trade blocs and the creation of
a constitutive UNASUR treaty, South American corporations could now move their business
anywhere in the continent.

During the early 2000s, FDI flowing into the region had decreased substantially because
of the global FDI downturn. However, due to the progress of the regional integration process,
globalization, stronger than expected domestic demand, higher commodities prices, and political
stability, FDI inflows have been rising exponentially since 2004. Regardless of the tax reforms
and the regulation of financial markets, FDI inflows into South American countries were almost
7 times larger in 2013 than in 2003 (Figure 2) according to the World Bank. According to a
report from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), FDI
inflows into South America were at all-time highs during 2013. However, they concentrated
heavily in 4 countries (Brazil, Chile, Peru and Colombia) and on the following industries: basic
industries (energy, mining, cement, cellulose, iron and steel), manufacturing of products of mass
consumption (food and beverages), and some services (electrical power, telecommunications, air
transport and retail sales). The rise of socialist more protectionist regimes has not affected the
rising trend of FDI inflows into the region, on the contrary, FDI inflows have been at all-time
high for the past 3 years. The tax and financial reforms adopted by the current leftist regimes did
not discourage investors. The past decade has been a period of drastic economic changes and
major political regime shifts, however, globalization, the successful regional integration process,
and political stability continue to make the South American region a desirable investment
destination.

Figure 2 - Total FDI inflows into Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay and Venezuela from 1999 to 2013 - Source: WDI.

Literature Review:
Since the early 2000s, political regimes among member countries of the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) have moved drastically to the left of the political spectrum. This
‘new’ leftist trend that is now governing the region has had a significant impact on economic
policies and regional economic integration. Most countries have adopted protectionist measures,
which differ substantially from the 1960s reforms, but follow the same overall protectionist
trend. Contrary to what many studies and scholars have concluded, these economic reforms have
had limited effects on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Several studies have tried to
determine the factors behind FDI inflows into developing regions producing mixed results. The
majority of the literature in the field of FDI flows into South America focuses on the effect of
FDI on economic growth, not on the determinants of FDI. However, among the relevant studies,
some scholars have found that most economic reform factors within a developing nation or
region have a bigger impact on foreign investors than governance and institutional factors
(Campos and Kinoshita, 2008). On the opposite side, some scholars argue that governance and
institutional factors have a stronger influence on foreign investors than economic reform factors
(Trevino, Thomas and Cullen, 2007; Busse and Hefeker, 2007).
However, neither of the previously mentioned scenarios can explain the resurgence in
FDI during the last 13 years. The rise of the ‘new’ left certainly brought political stability into
the region, but the nationalization of formerly private corporations, the adoption of protectionist
policies, and the rise of anti-imperialist sentiment should have discouraged foreign investors. The
majority of the current literature in the field argues that FDI is largely influenced by a
combination of both factors, economic and governmental (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006;
Montero, 2008; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2002). The mixed results come as a consequence
of the changing characteristics of the region, globalization, MNCs interests and economic cycles
(Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2002). The reality is that the neoliberal regime of the 1980s and
1990s have created economies dependent on FDI inflows. The somewhat protectionist financial
and tax reforms that have been implemented have not detracted foreign investors and even
accounting for shifts in governance factors, South America continues to be a desirable
destination for foreign capital. Given the rise of leftist governments – which has given
unprecedented strength to the integration process – and economic policy shifts among South

American governments, there is currently a need for further research on the determinants of FDI
in this new regional economic and political context.
Research Design:
Empirical Model –
For this study, several ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are estimated. OLS is a statistical
technique which attempts to find the function which most closely approximates the data, in other
words the ‘closest fit’. Given the high correlation between the governance variables, 6 different
regressions are completed to better measure their significance:
A) FDI = β0 + β1 FDI(−1) + β2 GOV. CONSUMPTION + β3 GROWTH + β4 OPENNESS +
β5 PROP. RIGHTS + β6 CRED. AVAILABILITY + β7 TAX
B) FDI = β0 + β1 FDI(−1) + β2 GOV. CONSUMPTION + β3 GROWTH + β4 OPENNESS +
β5 PROP. RIGHTS + β6 CRED. AVAILABILITY + β7 TAX + 𝛃𝛃𝟖𝟖 𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏
C) FDI = β0 + β1 FDI(−1) + β2 GOV. CONSUMPTION + β3 GROWTH + β4 OPENNESS +
β5 PROP. RIGHTS + β6 CRED. AVAILABILITY + β7 TAX + 𝛃𝛃𝟖𝟖 𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂. 𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂
D) FDI = β0 + β1 FDI(−1) + β2 GOV. CONSUMPTION + β3 GROWTH + β4 OPENNESS +
β5 PROP. RIGHTS + β6 CRED. AVAILABILITY + β7 TAX + 𝛃𝛃𝟖𝟖 𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑
E) FDI = β0 + β1 FDI(−1) + β2 GOV. CONSUMPTION + β3 GROWTH + β4 OPENNESS +
β5 PROP. RIGHTS + β6 CRED. AVAILABILITY + β7 TAX + 𝛃𝛃𝟖𝟖 𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑. 𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂
F) FDI = β0 + β1 FDI(−1) + β2 GOV. CONSUMPTION + β3 GROWTH + β4 OPENNESS +
β5 PROP. RIGHTS + β6 CRED. AVAILABILITY + β7 TAX + 𝛃𝛃𝟖𝟖 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆. 𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄
Dependent Variable –
a. FDI Inflows (% of GDP) – World Development Indicators.
This study gathers data from 10 South American countries during the 2002-2013 period. This
panel data analysis which represents 10 of the 11 UNASUR member countries – Suriname is left

out due to unavailability of data – aims to determine the impact of institutional and economic
variables on FDI inflows in the new socialist economic and political context governing the
region. To measure FDI inflows, the net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP from the World
Development Indicators is used. According to the World Bank, FDI is represented as the net
inflows of capital investment with the purpose of acquiring a lasting management interest (10
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the
investor. This measurement of FDI is used in the majority of the literature since it represents the
change in foreign investor’s positions in relation to the host economy (Biglaiser and DeRouen,
2006). It groups three main components: equity investment, reinvested earnings, and short and
long term inter-company loans between parent firms and foreign affiliates. Net FDI inflows as a
percentage of GDP serves as the most accurate measurement for the development of foreign
investors positions in the region (Montero, 2008).
Independent Variables –
1- Economic Reform Variables:
Since 2002, there have been a series of more protectionist economic reforms put in place that
focus on tax reforms, nationalization of formerly private enterprises, and the regulation of
financial markets. All of these reforms are considered and have been proven, by many studies, to
be factors that discourage foreign investors (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006; Montero, 2008). In
order to account for the changing economic environment in the region, this study includes
economic variables that are relevant to the region and its economic characteristics. To measure
openness and the degree to which countries have embraced the export-led model of
industrialization, trade as a percentage of GDP from the World Development Indicators is used.
Constant with current literature, trade as a percentage of GDP is the most widely used indicator
for trade openness (Montero, 2008). Alongside access to markets, foreign investors are also
worried about the risk of expropriation and how host countries will protect their property rights.
In South America many former private corporations have been nationalized - oil fields in
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil; gas fields in Bolivia, telecommunication corporations in
Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela, and newspapers in Chile, Peru and Uruguay (Castaneda,
2006). To account for this factor, this study uses the protection of property rights index
developed by the Global Competitiveness Report. This indicator takes into account the strength

of the legal system and the degree to which this legal system allows for the protection of
property rights.
Similar to the nationalization of corporations, South American governments have also
regularized financial markets. Governments, such as Maduro in Venezuela, Correa in Ecuador,
Morales in Bolivia, and Kirchner in Argentina, have limited the ability of private corporations to
get financing from the private domestic sector. This has been a trend among the region because
capital was flying out of the continent and was not being reinvested in the local economy
(Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006). To measure the access that the private sector has to capita, such
as loans, purchase of nonequity securities, trade credits, and accounts receivable, the domestic
credit to private sector as a percentage of the GDP from the World Development Indicators is
used. The last major economic reform that has taken place these past 12 years has been the
increase in the amount of taxes that corporations have to pay. To measure for this change, the tax
payments (numbers) from the World Development indicators is used. This is an indicators that
provides a more precise measurement of tax reform since overall corporate tax rates or
percentage of commercial profits have remained stable.
a. Trade (% of GDP) – World Development Indicators.
b. Protection of Property Rights – Global Competitiveness Report.
c. Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) – World Development Indicators.
d. Tax Payments (Numbers) – World Development Indicators.
2- Macroeconomic Variables –
Economically, the region has remained stable and has been able to recoup efficiently from
the 2008 crisis and bounce back to an average of 5% growth rates in 2013, according to the
World Bank. This surprising economic recovery in the region happened, in a large part, because
of the enormous amount of government expenditure on social programs, infrastructure, and
strategic industries – oil fields in Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil, copper mines in Chile and
Peru, gas fields in Bolivia and Paraguay, and agriculture in Argentina and Uruguay. To account
for economic growth, this study uses GDP growth (annual percentage) from the World
Development Indicators. Countries with higher growth rates are more attractive for foreign
investors since their domestic markets tend to be bigger (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006). Foreign

investors are also worried about the role that the state plays in the economy, therefore a more
controlling government is expected to detract foreign capital inflows. To measure government’s
control of the economy and overall government consumption, this study uses general
government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the World
Development Indicators. Finally, this study also accounts for previous experience of the host
country with FDI. Countries with a positive history of foreign investment flows are more likely
to continue to increase their FDI inflows (Montero, 2008).
a. GDP Growth (Annual %) – World Development Indicators.
b. General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% GDP) – World Development
Indicators.
c. FDI(-1) – World Development Indicators.
3- Governance Variables –
Several studies have found that governance variables also have the power to influence
foreign investor’s decisions. During the 2002-2013 period, the socialist governments that took
control of the region have increased political stability, government effectiveness and in some
cases the dynamism of their civil societies. These variables, alongside level of accountability and
strength of the legal system, have been proven to influence foreign investor’s positions in
relation to the host country (Montero, 2008). Given the fact that FDI inflows into South America
have diversified, in terms of where capital is going and where it is coming from, there is a need
for further research in this new economic and political context. The Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WDI) are used to measure the impact that different governance factors have on FDI
inflows. These indicators are based on 32 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private
sectors firms. The WGI breaks down into 6 broad categories. For the purpose of these study,
given the high correlation between variables and the fact that not all of them are applicable to
this study, only 4 will be used as separate measurements:
a. Control of Corruption: Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

b. Rule of Law: Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
c. Regulatory Control: Measures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development.
d. Government Effectives: Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment
to such policies.
It is also important to make a distinction between the different types of socialist governments
in South America. There are currently two types of socialist governments – populist leftist
regimes and social democracies – which differ greatly from past socialist movements
(Castaneda, 2006). The first group is composed of Maduro in Venezuela, Kirchner in Argentina,
Morales in Bolivia, and Correa in Ecuador. These governments are characterized by the
concentration of power in the hands of populist head of states, not having a strong ideological
attachment, and creating a repressive environment for opposition movements. In the other hand,
there are truly social democracies, composed of Bachelet in Chile, Vazquez in Uruguay, and
Rousseff in Brazil, which have a stronger ideological attachment, a decentralized institutional
structure, and an active civil society. In order to measure regime type we use the Polity IV index
developed by the Center for Systemic Peace. This index quantifies the qualities of democratic
and autocratic authority in governing institutions. Through the Polity IV index we can measure
how autocratic or democratic South American regimes are, given the different regimes in place –
populist left and social democrats – and the effect that regime type has on FDI inflows.
e. Polity IV: Measures the degree of autocratic or democratic qualities that government
institutions and government themselves have implemented in their political system.

Empirical Results –
Group

Variable
GDP Growth

Macroeconomic Government
Consumption
FDI Inflows (-1)
Openness
Protection of
Property Rights
Credit
Availability
Tax Reform

Economic
Reforms

Polity

Governance

A
0.024
(0.034)
-0.197***
(0.054)
0.437***
(0.071)
-0.014
(0.008)
0.532***
(0.098)
0.023***
(0.008)
0.009
(0.005)

Control of
Corruption
Rule of Law
Regulatory
Control
Government
Effectiveness
Constant

R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Number of Observations

1.729
(1.047)
0.767
0.751
110

B
0.014
(0.033)
-0.206***
(0.054)
0.395***
(0.076)
-0.018
(0.008)
0.465***
(0.105)
0.027***
(0.008)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.100
(0.063)

1.605
(1.042)
0.773
0.755
110

C
0.014
(0.033)
-0.144**
(0.057)
0.389***
(0.073)
-0.008
(0.007)
0.465**
(0.130)
0.017**
(0.008)
0.011
(0.005)
0.662**
(0.292)

2.159**
(1.043)
0.779
0.751
110

D
0.025
(0.033)
-0.176***
(0.058)
0.421***
(0.075)
-0.012
(0.007)
0.471***
(0.125)
0.020**
(0.008)
0.008
(0.005)

0.243
(0.319)

1.943*
(1.086)
0.769
0.750
110

E
0.022
(0.033)
-0.163***
(0.055)
0.369***
(0.078)
-0.011
(0.007)
0.400***
(0.116)
0.016*
(0.008)
0.010*
(0.005)

F
0.025
(0.033)
-0.151**
(0.059)
0.401***
(0.074)
-0.007
(0.008)
0.410***
(0.119)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.007
(0.005)

0.648**
(0.324)
2.259**
(1.065)
0.776
0.758
110

0.645*
(0.374)
1.860*
(1.039)
0.774
0.756
110

Table 1 - Main entries are regression coefficients with unbalanced data; numbers in between parenthesis are standard errors. The
dependent variable is net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. Significance is marked the following way: * sig. at .10; ** sig. at
.05; *** sig. at .01.

Conclusion –
During the past 30 years there have been major political and economic changes in South
America. The region went from having a neoliberal capitalist regime in place, which started with
the military dictatorships of the 1960s, to a socialist leftist regime. Alongside this major political
regime shift, these governments have also implemented economic reforms. These reforms mostly
focused on tax reforms, the regulation of financial markets and the nationalization of formerly
private corporations. Even with the implementations of protectionist economic reforms during

the past decade, FDI inflows into the region continue to grow at a constant rate. Current studies
that take into account institutional and governance factors and also the UNASUR, have
demonstrated that foreign investors priorities have shifted but they fail to show how. Studies
done during the 1980s and 1990s, demonstrated that foreign investors were worried mostly about
trade openness, deregulated markets and size of the host economy. These studies were done
during the neoliberal economic and political regime that lasted from the 1960s until the late
1990s. However, the most recent studies, those that have been done during the socialist leftist
regime and that include governance factors, have shown that it is actually a combination of
factors which attract foreign capital.
Consistent with the most recent studies, my research demonstrates that there are several
variables that impact FDI inflows into member countries of the UNASUR. Under the six
different OLS estimations, the variables that seem to be most significant were: protection of
property rights, credit availability, control of corruption, regulatory control, and government
effectiveness. By controlling for macroeconomic conditions, the economic reform variables that
proved to be significant in all six models were protection of property rights, which measures risk
of expropriation, and domestic access to capital, which measures credit availability. Protection of
property rights showed to be significant in all models at the 1% level except in model C, where it
was significant at the 5% level. Similarly, domestic access to capital proved to be significant in
all six models. For models A and B it was significant at the 1% level, for models C and D at the
5% level, and lastly in models E and F it was significant at the 10% level. Contrary to what many
studies have produced, openness and tax reforms were not significant. In relation to economic
reform variables, this study proves that foreign investor’s priorities have shifted from focusing
on normative factors and not solely on countries with neoliberal trade and tax structures. In
regards to the governance variables, this study concludes that control of corruption, regulatory
control, and government effectiveness were significant in models C, E, and F. Control of
corruption was significant at the 5% level, regulatory control also at the 5% level, and lastly
government effectiveness was significant at the 10% level. Surprisingly, rule of law and the
polity index, which accounts for the type of regime, were not significant. The increase in
significance for the governance factors over time reinforce the argument that foreign investors
priorities have shifted.

The current socialist protectionist regime in place has clearly not discouraged foreign
investors. Current FDI inflows into member countries of the UNASUR are currently at all-time
highs and they will continue to grow over time. Foreign investors are now concerned about how
well a country’s legal system can protect their property rights and their intellectual property.
Historically, the region has a history of nationalizing corporations and the risk of expropriation
continues to be a major determinant of FDI. MNC’s that are looking to move their business into
the region are also concerned about capital and credit availability in that country since domestic
credit, depending on the credit conditions, has become a major source of financing for MNC’s.
As the different models tell us, there are also governance and normative variables that have
become more significant alongside the rise of the UNASUR and the political and economic
integration of the region. Foreign investors are worried about the level of corruption given that
historically and even until today, South American governments continue to have high levels of
corruption. Foreign investors are also worried about the regulatory environment in the region,
which measures the ability of the government to implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development. Lastly, government effectiveness, which
measures the quality of government agencies and the commitment of the government to their
policies also impacts FDI inflows into the region. This study demonstrates that the new
economic and political regime in the region has shifted foreign investor’s priorities and that
neoliberalism is no longer the path towards bigger FDI inflows.
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